REPUBLIC OF KENYA

HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA
HURIA

Kwale County
Plan for Countering Violent Extremism

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ACRONYMS

ACT	Act Change Transform
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CG	Commissioner General
CSIC	County Security Intelligence Committee
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DPCs	District Peace Committees
FBOs	Faith Based Organization
FGDs	Focused Group Discussions
GoK	Government of Kenya
HURIA	Human Rights Agenda
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KCPCVE	Kwale County plan for Counter Violent Extremism
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
NSCVE	National Strategy for Counter Violent Extremism
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
VE	Violent Extremism

MESSAGE FROM THE GOVERNOR OF KWALE

Radicalisation is a problem fueled by global ideological conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Syria among other hot spots. The conflict in Somalia has attracted many Kenyan Muslim youths. Many youth from Kwale joined Al-Shabaab and travelled to Somalia and on their return they have imported violence and killings into Kwale mainly targeting elders and businesses.

Majority of the Al-Shabaab recruits from Kwale County either have primary level school certificate or are secondary school level drops outs. A few have completed secondary school and fewer have gone to college. We acknowledge that our youth at all levels are vulnerable to recruitment. As Kwale County Leaders, we acknowledge the problem, which must be tackled urgently so as to stabilize the region and give confidence for the tourism sector to flourish. Continued instability in Kwale County will kill our tourism economy and fuel the cycle of poverty. With this plan we have identified short-term and long-term interventions and strategies to address the problem. My Government will work with communities, imams and scholars, the national government civil society and other stakeholders to firmly address the factors that drive our youth into radicalisation and violent extremism by implementing this plan. This war cannot be won through guns and law enforcement measures alone. We must win the hearts and minds of people in the coast region while being firm but fair.

Finally let me applaud civil society, especially HURIA, for driving the development of the Kwale plan for CVE. The universities have helped us to understand the problem and to design interventions. I applaud the donors for sharing their experiences and for the material support.

HE Governor Salim M Mvurya

MESSAGE FROM THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER , KWALE

Violent Extremism has emerged as a major global security challenge in the last 2½ decades. It is complex, dynamic and driven by a cocktail of pull and push factors. Kenya has been particularly hard hit by this threat. The national government together with other partners and stakeholders have expended huge resources to contain it.

Kwale County has been grappling with this problem over an extended period of time. The bulk of the means deployed have been dominated by criminal justice and intelligence-led approaches. These have proven critical to limiting the ambitions and capabilities of violent extremists. However, to travel from reaction to prevention, it has proven necessary to embrace preventive and mitigation approaches that deploy countering radicalisation and rehabilitation where appropriate. Such approaches have been few and far between, inefficient, ineffective and with minimal impact. This, therefore, informed the need to come up with a comprehensive, coherent and accountable plan to address these gaps.

This document marks a defining moment in the fight against violent extremism in the county. It is a product of joint efforts by Kwale born scholars and National Government administration and security officials. The intellectuals' research has yielded invaluable insights to the existing body knowledge of violent extremism and has complemented the experience and judgment of the government officers.

The Kwale plan of action is anchored in the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism that was launched by His Excellency the President on 7 September 2016. The NSCVE provides the overall framework and strategic level thinking that the effort in Kwale has localised in a way that speaks to our unique challenges. The bridge between the national and the county level has been provided by the NCTC and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. We recognise the need for close coordination of the national to county level since this is a challenge that travels beyond Kwale and that requires the smooth integration of multiple efforts and actors.

The support of the civil society, strategic partners and donors in finalizing this plan under the direction of HURIA is appreciated. We cannot forget the useful input of the Kwale County Government in the whole process.

Finally, the challenge will be in the implementation of the plan. As the Convenor of the Kwale County C.V.E. Forum, my office promises to provide leadership in ensuring that the objectives outlined in this document are achieved at the end of the five-year period. We, thus, invite all stakeholders to join us in this journey.

KUTSWA OLAKA
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
KWALE COUNTY

MESSAGE FROM HURIA

All citizens and property require protection and security from harm for development and prosperity to be achieved. When citizens and their property are secure, they easily attain other needs that are necessary for their livelihoods and wellbeing. Security remains the basic and fundamental unit of human needs and wants. The threat to security due to among other factors, radicalisation and violent extremism, in our midst is real. Though global in nature, radicalisation and violent extremism have local face and manifestations. Countering radicalisation and violent extremism must therefore involve both national and local efforts. However, for these efforts to be well structured and coordinated, Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) and its partners mooted the idea of developing a CVE plan for Kwale County.

The Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (KCPCVE) is therefore a collaborative milestone between HURIA, the Ministry of Interior, Security and National Government Coordination, the County Government of Kwale and the civil society. The development of this plan is not only an accomplishment to HURIA but also to all CVE practitioners in Kwale County, the region, Kenya and beyond. The Plan was developed as one of the flagship activities under HURIA and supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through Act Change Transform (Act!).

The willingness of the two tier Governments, national and county, to partner with civil society with a human rights backdrop such as HURIA in developing the Plan is remarkable. Indeed, the partnership marks a major paradigm shift in the Governments' attitude and commitment towards not only working with human rights Organisations but also in countering radicalisation and violent extremism in the Country. Such collaborative efforts sets the framework upon which other counties can emulate in tackling common challenges that affects them.

Borrowing its tenets and spirit from the National CVE , this Kwale Plan is the first in the Country that hopes to provide a model to be replicated in other Counties. It provides an important framework for CVE embedded with human rights principles. The plan is mindful and conscientious of the evolving nature of violent extremism factors that pull and push potential and vulnerable youth to radicalisation that leads to violent extremism including terrorism. It also provides for a robust monitoring and evaluation framework that will ensure its sustained relevance over the years.

Finally, we recall that the process of developing the plan was complex, tedious but most importantly consultative and inclusive. Accordingly, HURIA sincerely acknowledges and appreciates all the efforts and support, individual or institutional, towards the development of the first Kwale CVE plan. It is our hope therefore that this plan will provide the necessary and envisioned guidance and structure for engagement of the various stakeholders in CVE in the county.

Prof. Halimu Shauri
Chairperson, Board of Directors,
HURIA

Yusuf Lule Mwatsefu
Executive Director
HURIA

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Kwale County Plan to Counter Violent Extremism is an outcome of both desk reviews, field research and discussions involving national government and County officials in Kwale, representatives from the National Counter Terrorism Centre and the civil society. This process was conducted between the months of July 2016 and January 2017 through the leadership of Prof. Hassan Mwakimako, who was consulted by HURIA to draw the CVE plan. Field research involved key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) involving participation of residents and people with extensive knowledge of the county. Participants in the survey included youth, women, opinion leaders, and members of peace committees (DPCs), Government of Kenya (GoK), County Government of Kwale officials and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

The completion of this plan has been led by Prof. Hamadi Boga, the Vice Chancellor of the Taita Taveta University and Prof. Halimu Shauri of ..Pwani University. We would like to thank the Board of Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) for affording us the opportunity to undertake this remarkable initiative. The secretariat under the able leadership of Mr. Yusuf Mwatsefu Lule, partnered with Dr. Steve Ouma Akoth, an academic and chair of the Malaika Foundation to steer the process. The research and public consultations leading to this plan was made possible through the support, cooperation and encouragement of many people.

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is the national coordinator of the National Strategy to Counter Violence Extremism (NSCVE) which forms the strategic and coordinating framework that aligns the Kwale plan with neighbouring counties, national government and foreign bilateral and multilateral partners. The NCTC has walked with the Kwale team throughout and we look forward to growing this partnership, and ensuring Kwale remains at the national forefront in preventing violent extremism. We are also indebted to the representatives of national security agencies in Kwale who participated and gave their critical input to the process.

The County Commissioner, Kwale County Mr. Olaka Kutswa was instrumental from the beginning and made invaluable inputs during the data collection and validation processes. His constant presence and support during the consultative meetings leading to this plan ensured the success of this exercise. Similarly, the office of the Kwale County Governor, through the County Secretary supported the development of the plan by providing information and participating in meetings. The civic commons and the civil society fraternity in Kwale County gave their invaluable time in responding to the many questions while making themselves available to participate in the validation process. We also greatly acknowledge the support of our partners the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Royal Danish Embassy and Act Change and Transform (Act!) who not only followed through the process and were always ready to assist but also believing in our capacity to execute the assignment from the onset. We are also indebted to the International Organization for Migration (IoM) for the kind support in seeing the process concluded. We would also like to thank the three very able assistants, Abdalla Ali Kidyogo, Japheth Oluoch Ogola and Beatrice Sidi for their commitment and positive attitude throughout the process. Their enthusiasm provided the much-needed energy towards the completion of this task.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the Kwale County Plan to Counter Violent Extremism (KCPCVE) is to define the manifestation and practical measures for countering radicalisation and violent extremism in Kwale County. It guides the people of Kwale working with the County Government and national security agencies to prevent radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist groups, and contribute to restorative efforts for those already radicalised or who have joined violent extremist groups.

The Kwale Plan is anchored in the overall approaches, definitions and coordinating frameworks provided by the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE). The linking of Kwale's unique challenges to the national -- and by extension regional and global -- picture acknowledges that VE is borderless. It also connects Kwale's solutions to broader support and experiences to our advantage.

This plan has been prepared to meet specific objectives including; guiding concrete activities at six interlinked stages of intervention to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism and to enable practitioners, actors and interlocutors of CVE in Kwale to successfully integrate relevant programs tailored to current and historical local circumstances. The plan is prepared on the realisation that CVE has increasingly become a prominent framework for countering the influence of individuals and entities involved in violent extremism (VE). Widely understood to describe a range of preventative and non-coercive measures this CVE Plan involves, for instance community debates on contested matters, media messaging, interfaith dialogues, training of state government and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed "at risk" of being drawn to violence, such as vocational training, mentorship programs and other initiatives which build inclusive societies. As an action plan, it will assist policy makers and implementers through a context based defined understanding of contemporary drivers of VE and taking into account the wider context in which violence and radicalisation occurs in Kwale County.

This plan approaches CVE through two broadly defined themes of **Prevention** and **Restorative** Efforts. The first part of the plan makes use of six interlinked efforts: formative; anticipatory; targeted intervention; disengagement; rehabilitation; and reintegration. These components are used to define and present the manifestation of VE in Kwale. Each of the six components is expected to generate interventionist activities by addressing the core aspects in the pull and push factors in the specific locale in which they occur. While this may sound obvious, there is a substantial risk that undue emphasis is placed on unemployment, poverty and other structural factors. While such issues may be of considerable relevant in Kwale, they are certainly not in themselves sufficient conditions for the occurrence of VE and in specific contexts they may not even be necessary

The second component of the plan defines the most appropriate models of responding to the VE situation. In Kwale, convergence of extremist religious ideology, political marginalisation, unemployment and poverty have served as catalysts for recruitment into violent extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS). Since CVE activities have been ongoing in Kwale county, they have sought to strengthen community and citizen mobilisation

against VE. However, radicalisation and terrorist violence persists. It is therefore crucial that these mobilisation efforts against radicalisation and recruitment be ENHANCED.

For citizen and community efforts to be successful, there must be security provided by the government, which must demonstrate that it has the desire and will to provide safety for civilians engaged in this plan. This demands an IMPROVEMENT in the government's law enforcement responsiveness. It is also important for security agencies do their part in protecting the Constitution of Kenya by ensuring none of its provisions and rights is broken, particularly in their PROTECTING and RESPECTING the human rights of citizens including those who are deemed as suspects.

This plan also recognizes that multiple actors are engaged in CVE efforts and identifies the role that each can effectively participate in order to leverage resources and proper coordination. It is for that reason that the plan identifies the roles that stakeholders including the individual citizens of Kwale, FBOs, and CSOs will play to ensure a successful implementation of the plan. We have also specifically singled out the role that women can play as strategic partners and actors in countering violent extremism. In regard to engaging with foreign governments and international organisations, as well as other actors, the NSCVE offers a coordinating framework to ensure less duplication, better synergy, accountability, transparency and overall effectiveness.

The plan will be implemented through three phases: Prevention, Identification and Exit. **Prevention** will have three main activities: Improving preventive action by the County government through collaboration with security actors, agencies engaged in development, training, the provision of varied public services and youth outreach. It will initiate development projects which engage youth to reduce unemployment and underemployment thus offering hope that counters the appeal of extremism. It will also work with religious leaders and groups, particularly madrassas and Muslim faith leaders, to counter the false religious claims that VEs use to propagate their ideology and justify their terrorist actions. Identification will improve citizen and community knowledge of VE so that radicalisation and recruitment becomes more difficult to deploy in Kwale. People of Interest Analysis (POI) analysis will increase the knowledge of the Kwale public on determining we that a person is radicalised or is under threat of being radicalised. Exit will adopt two approaches: combating VE and dealing with the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.

KEY TERMS

1. **After-care** is the continued support of individuals who have been rehabilitated and reintegrated to ensure that they sustain the legal conduct.

2. **Community** is a residential area-usually a neighborhood, town, or city-where individuals share a common environment. Communities can also include groups of people who share special interests or express a common religion or ethnicity. Communities can also exist in cyberspace and can be as meaningful to individuals as those in which they live physically.

3. **Counter messaging** is the rebuttal of specific terrorist/violent extremist messages intended to delegitimise and undermine their trustworthiness and appeal to those they target and the public at large.

4. Counter-narrative is a deliberate intervention by a state or non-state organisation engaged in CVE that challenges the legitimacy and credibility of the stories and worldview promoted by violent extremist groups and their recruitment campaigns. It includes the promotion of facts, experiences and stories supportive of engaged, peaceful and lawful citizenship in Kenya.

5. **Countering Violent Extremism** (CVE) is the employment of non-coercive means to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies and thus reduce the number of terrorist group supporters and recruits.

6. **Disengagement** refers to individuals deserting, defecting or demobilising from terrorist groups and activities. This is a behavioral or declarative act and does not necessarily include the psychological and social dimensions of de-radicalisation.

7. **De-radicalisation** refers to concerted efforts directed at radicalised individuals to cause them to change their views to reject violent extremist ideologies and to seek to act within Kenya's legal and constitutional bounds. It is often aimed at prisoners convicted of terrorist or violent extremist crimes, or voluntary returnees from active participation in terrorist groups.is a process that aims to ensure that disengaged and de-radicalised violent extremists and terrorists, particularly returnees from Al Shabaab and like groups, are given the counseling, critical reasoning tools, and knowledge to shift their mind-sets and enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens.

8. **Disruption** refers to security or law enforcement actions intended to interrupt violent actions through arrest, deportations, or physical force.

9. **Disengagement** refers to individuals deserting, defecting or demobilising from terrorist groups and activities. This is a behavioural or declarative act and does not necessarily include the psychological and social dimensions of de-radicalisation.

10. **Mobilisation** is the process by which radicalised individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence or material support for violence to advance their cause.

11. **Monitoring** is a security component that is often folded into aftercare but that may be a separate activity in which family members, NGOs, or law enforcement track individuals who leave de-radicalisation programs to determine if they are reengaging in extremist activities.

12. **Radicalisation** is a gradual or phased process that employs the ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialize them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist

groups or campaigns. It is dependent on a fanatical ideology that rejects dialogue and compromise in favor of a ends-justifies-ends approach, particularly in the willingness to utilize mass violence to advance political aims – defined in racial, ethnic, sectarian and religious terms – opposed to the democratic principles enshrined in Kenya's Constitution.

13.   **Reengagement** occurs when an individual who has stopped violent extremist activities-often due to incarceration or involvement in a program-returns to these activities. Such individuals, particularly when they have been through formal disengagement programs, are often referred to as recidivists.

14.   **Reintegration** refers to actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run.

15.   **Resilience** refers to the capacity of individuals and communities to manage and overcome adversity and risk. It is a dynamic concept assessed by considering the balance of risk and protective factors at a given moment.

16.   **Violent Extremism** – refers to actions of radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies.

CHAPTER 1: **INTRODUCTION**

Located in South-Eastern Kenya, Kwale County borders the Republic of Tanzania to the South West and the following counties, Taita Taveta to the West and north West; Kilifi to the North and North East; and Mombasa to the East. It borders the Indian Ocean to the East and South East. It has a population of about 649,931 (2009 census) in an area of 8, 270.2 square kilometers. The County has 4 constituencies; Msambweni, Lunga Lunga, Matuga and Kinango. Administratively, Kwale has 20 wards comprising 4 sub counties, 9 divisions, 37 locations and 84 sub locations. Kwale population categories include males (315,997) Female (333,934). Children below the age of 17 years comprise 53.83% of the population and youth ages 18-35 comprise about 27.45% people of the age above 65 comprise 3.50% of the population of Kwale.

The Concept of Violent Extremism

Violent Extremism (VE) refers to actions of radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies. While radical thinking is by no means a problem in itself, it becomes a threat when citizens, communities, residents or groups promote or engage in violence, profiling or genocidal activities as a means of furthering political, ideological or religious views.

VE entered the consciousness of Kenyans most prominently with the 1998 suicide bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi by Al Qaeda. The spread of violent extremism (VE) in Kenya threatens to erode the secure and peaceful environment. Over the last two years, Kwale has experienced over 26 murders of youth, elders and some radicalised youth associated with Al-Shabaab, especially in Ukunda and its environs. Further, the activities of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) have been heightened over the past few years.

The threat of VE goes beyond its violence. Its promotion of ideas and ideologies at odds with the rights and obligations that are constitutionally anchored for all Kenyan citizens and residents of the country means that it is at war with Kenya's way of life. The freedoms of religion, speech, equality, association, and where any citizen may reside, are targeted by VE. As such, Kenyans who are freedom loving, who are in accord with our Constitution and embrace the Promise of Citizenship, are opposed to VE in its ideological, moral and operational manifestations.

Vision

A society free from the danger and fear posed by radicalisation and violent extremism.

Mission

17. Building a Kwale where individuals and communities are able to withstand radicalisation eliminate the sense of marginalisation and discrimination, and ensuring society is resilient to the vagaries of violent extremism.

Objectives

18. The broad objective of this plan is to prevent the people in Kwale from becoming radicalised and recruited to extremist groups, and to promote restorative efforts towards people who are already radicalised. The plan has been prepared to meet the following specific objectives:

- To guide concrete activities at six interlinked effort stages of interventions to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism

- To enable practitioners in Kwale County to successfully integrate relevant plans tailored to local circumstances.

Core values

21. The national values of patriotism, rule of law, equity, sustainable development and ethics are highly emphasized in the Constitution. This CVE plan recognizes the significance of the national values which are seen as enablers for the nation to build a tolerant culture based on diversity that gives preference to nationhood. Effective implementation of this plan is dependent on the following realities:

- Appreciation of the magnitude of violent extremism in Kwale and the local and global forces that fuel it.

- Responsiveness to the emerging threats of violent extremist on the security of the people of Kwale, the nation and the globe

- Consciousness to the threat posed to peaceful co-existence and economic prosperity

- Recognition of the significance of the roles of County and National Governments in providing leadership in countering Violent Extremism

- Embracing the need for collaborative efforts between state and non-state actors in countering violent extremist

- Concern about the growing trend of young people of Kwale subscribing to ideological doctrines that are responsible for radicalisation

- Acknowledging the significant role to be played by development partners and regional bodies, county and national government as allies and partners in countering violent extremist endeavors in Kwale.

CHAPTER 2: **THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL FRAMING FOR KWALE CVE PLAN**

General assessment of extremism in Kwale

Kwale County, like the rest of Kenya, is confronted by the security, social and political challenge of violent extremism (VE). There are multiple kinds of violent extremism but the ones that most impact Kwale County are seperatism -- as put forward by the Mombasa Republican Council -- and the salafi-jihadism of Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and ISIS.

The roots, drivers and causes of VE are therefore not limited to the security sector, they are to be found in Kwale's dynamic histories of politics, power, privilege, economic and religious dynamics, ethnic relations, demographics and social changes. Despite this complexity, VE has, until now, been faced principally as a security challenge. This has meant a heavy investment of security resources almost to the exclusion of other pressing problems such as drug abuse, robberies, human/wildlife conflict and farmers-herdsmen conflicts.

The result is a society faced with a pressing security challenge but without the range of interventions that can prevent and mitigate it comprehensively. This has led to a society with a sense of being helpless onlookers to the VE challenge.

Histories Contributing to VE

The history of Kwale must be properly studied in relation to VE. Though VE has mostly been associated by scholars and the broader public with in the last two decades, it is connected to earlier events and dynamics that require greater attention if lasting solutions are to be found. For instance, the histories of marginalisation, economic deprivation and ethnic relations go beyond the relationships between government and communities. Earlier histories rooted in the colonial era, and the preceding periods must be taken into account for they explain the relations between communities, access to

resources such as land and how governance has been practiced in ways that impact identity, attitudes and beliefs. It is therefore proposed that investigations and research be undertaken under the following NSCVE pillars: political, arts and culture, and the faith based and ideological pillar. It is also worth quoting the NSCVE's research agenda *"CVE needs to be driven by evidence adapt to change as necessary. This requires that it be anchored in robust conceptual approaches and empirical research rooted in the particularities of regions, countries, and local neighbourhoods and communities."* This approach should be utilised in relation to the historical realities that inform VE and CVE today.

Political Dynamics Contributing to VE

The most frequent occurrences of VE have been associated with political behaviors. Politics, particularly during election periods, has been responsible for most incidents of VE. The Kaya Bombo raids of 1997 were as a result of the politicisation of the relationship between indigenous and migrant communities, which led to the violent attempt to evict the latter from the South Coast. This trend of utilising thc conflicts between indigenous and migrant communities to further political interests continued during the 2007 post-election violence. In addition, during the period leading to the 2013 election the emergence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) was

associated with violence that rocked some parts of Coast as the group pushed for a polls boycott. These political dynamics are deeply related to the historical legacy of Kwale. It is important that the Kwale Plan take advantage of the Political Pillar of the national strategy. This can engage with institutions such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Parliamentary leadership, caucuses and forums, and political leadership engagement groups to moderate combative, divisive politics in Kwale.

Religious Dynamics Contributing to VE

Apart from elective politics, another cause of violence in Kwale is radicalisation particularly that utilising extremist and politicised readings of religion. Vulnerable citizens in Kwale — by virtue of myriad social, economic and political crises in their lives -- are manipulatively engaged by radicalisers and recruiters. In particular, some extremist and anti-Kenya preachers have exploited their positions and even mosques to radicalise youth in Kwale into a posture of hatred and to encourage violence against migrant communities, government officers, tourists and targets associated with the West and secular government..

The problem of salafi-jihadism did not sprout out overnight but grew out of puritanical and politicised preachings that began in the early 1990s. The larger society did not seem to notice. The common refrain was – "*yes they are extreme but they are minding their own business*". For Al-Shabaab these radicalised and disconnected youth have provided a source of recruits many of whom went to Somalia and came back with the motivation to extend Al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya. Radicalisation has driven a sizeable number of youth to travel to Somali in order to participate in fighting Jihad and thereby training and acquiring fighting skills. Some of these youth have since returned and have been associated with violent incidents in Kwale. Both negative elective politics and radical sermons have fueled conditions that favor radicalisation and violent extremism. It is upon stakeholders to now design counter measures to reverse the decline and promote peace, cohesion and coexistence.

Economic Dynamics Contributing to VE

Kwale is endowed with natural resources and a strategic location, but these have been exploited well in regard to the opportunities, jobs and livelihoods of many locals. Poverty is endemic, the educational gap with the rest of the country is substantive, and this adds up to a sense of marginalisation and hopelessness in many of Kwale's indigenous citizens. The resulting feelings of humiliation and disaffection have been seized on by cynical politicians, radicalisers and recruiters. Many, but not all, recruits to VE groups believe that their personal economic circumstances will change for the better by joining. It is crucial for more livelihood and job opportunities to be availed to the people of Kwale, and for them to be accessible to members of indigenous communities. As such, national and county government development initiatives, those of bilateral and multilateral partners, should be targeted at sharply raising employment opportunities.

Hotspots

In Kwale there are specific locations that have been hard hit by extensive by radicalisation of individuals, families and communities, recruitment to Al-shabaab and the effects of returnees who have been implicated in

incidents of political violence and radicalisation. These VE hotspots are Diani, Ukunda, Kona Ya Musa, Bongwe, Mbuwani, Tiwi, Ngombeni, Kombani, Mwapala, Matuga and Lunga Lunga. In these locations violence has either been associated with the activities of MRC or returnee extremists who have travelled to Somalia, learned to use weapons, and have returned to continue propagation, recruitment and radicalising others.

Pull and Push factors

There is no single factor that causes VE to spread. Rather, it is a combination of push (structural) and pull (individual incentives) factors that eventually, lead to individuals to join extremist groups. Involvement in VE results from 'gradual' exposure to and socialization -- through an ideological construct and psychological process

-- towards the legitimization of violence as a tool to achieve political and other ends. A salient combination of factors will vary according to the context, even within the same county. In Kwale County, VE can be attributed to historical factors including claims of historical injustices over land, ethnic, generational and religious clashes of identity, politicisation of religion, colonial and pre-colonial legacies such as slavery and wars, youth rebellion, cultism, unemployment, drug abuse, claims of marginalisation, harassment by security officials, extra-judicial killings, misinterpretation of religious teachings, appeals by radical groups and hero-worshipping of extremist individuals. All these factors combine in a complex fashion to further narratives of rage and dispossession, secessionism, mistrust and opposition to the government and openness to salafi-jihadist ideology and aims.

1. The *Kwale County* the most prevalent factors were indicated below.

	Push Factors	Pull Factors
Kwale County	• Poverty • Drugs and petty criminality • Low levels of civic awareness/engagement • Unemployment /under-employment • Marginalisation (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) • Poor educational attainment • Lack of critical thinking skills • Poor police-community relations (harassment, profiling) • Poor service delivery by government (county & national) • Land alienation and other historical injustices	• Politicisation and instrumentalistion of Jihad as terrorist tool • Utilisation of cult methods to confuse, brainwash, recruit and control • Deliberate interpretation of religious texts to promote VE and salafi-jihadist • Flow of foreign monies to promote extremist and puritanical teaching • Penetration of salafist settings by receruiters who manipulate the salafist message with extremist politics • Hero worship of extremist individuals

	Push Factors	Pull Factors
	• Lack of parental guidance	• Search for redemption • Search for affirmative identity

Table 1: Push and pull factors (summarized from project documents).

Interventions

So far, the National Government has undertaken security measures to counter radicalisation and violent extremism in Kwale. Nyumba Kumi Committees have been formed and the National Police Service has targeted radicalised individuals. Further the Provincial administration has implemented an amnesty program to convince returnees to surrender in exchange for amnesty and material support. Civil Society has also conducted awareness programs targeting youth, imams, madrasa teachers and other vulnerable individuals. The County government has largely been on the sidelines, laying the problem at the feet of the National Government. Business promotion activities have been approached generally without focus on the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism.

2. This complexity of the VE situation in Kwale is explained through the SWOT and PESTLE analysis below:

SWOT Analysis

CATEGORY	INTERNAL		EXTERNAL	
	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
(1) LEADERSHIP	• Committed National Government Officials • Indigenous County Government Officials • Religious leaders (Muslim and Christian) • Private sector leaders • Philanthropists (particularly for religious and youth causes)	• Political leaders not engaged in solutions. • Fear by the Clergy • Fear by the Nyumba Kumi • Poor service delivery		

CATEGORY	INTERNAL		EXTERNAL	
	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
(2) HUMAN RESOURCE	• National Govt Officials • County Govt Officials • Civil Society professionals • Clergy • Counselors and psychologists • Teachers • Public health workers • Police & security officials • Surrendered returnees	• Low lecel of CVE awareness and skill • Low disengagement & counter radicalisation skills • lack of structured risk assessment and response of radicalisation • Uncoordinated case management • Limited number of Police	• Training at scale by NCTC and and Ministry of Interior and National Coordination • Coordinated training intervention support by partners • Ensuring frontline worlers are informed and skilled • Connecting researchers to frontline workets	• Al-Shabaab and ISIL Recruiters • MRC • Political attack of CVE efforts
(3) IMPLEMENTATION	• Constitution • NCTC support • National and County Government's existing structures • Civil Society • Philanthropists • Religious leaders/ institutions • Researchers • Youth • Women	• Ownership problem • No coordination • Poor leadership • The absence of order in the madrasa/ mosque systems and flexible nature of Madrasa curriculum • Low connect between evidence and action	• Devolution • Constitution of Kenya 2010 • Research Institutions • NSCVE • Coordinated structures	• Spread of salafi-jihadism • Theological issues • Unattended historical injustices • Unemployment • No legal framework • Police- community mistrust

| (4) FINANCIAL REOURCES | • National Government
• County Government
• Civil Society
• Business (CSR)
• Philanthropists | • Dependence on out-of-Kwale resources
• Uncoordinated activities
• Inadequate amounts & irregular flow | • Kwale-driven funding (county, businesses, individuals)
• Coordinated donor support
• CSO resources | • Divergent interests by stakeholders
• Fraud
• Perverse incentives (per diem mentality) |

Table 2: SWOT Analysis

PESTLE Analysis

CATEGORY	ISSUES	EFFECTS
(1) Political	• Political indifference among elected leaders • National Government policy on violent extremism • Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial ethnic, religious and political relations leading to marginalisation and even subjugation. • County Government policy on violent extremism • Attack on traditional forms of worship and Islam by extremists • Global war on terror	• Ineffective Leadership on the VE issue • Unsettled and conflictual ethnic relations and exploitative networks of patronage • NSCVE launched by H.E. the President • No policy framework from CG • Increased discrimination in the inter-faith and intra-faith context leading to reduced freedom of religion • GOT has been messaged by VEs and their supporters as a fight against Islam • Some supporters of the GOT have unfairly profiled Islam as a threat
(2) Economic	• Slow economic growth • Low levels of entrepreneurship • Skills not aligned with job market • Economic corruption • Uneven development	• Few employment opportunities • Stifling of opportunities • Marginalisation

CATEGORY	ISSUES	EFFECTS
(3) Socio-Cultural	• Aggressive entry of (legal) salafist beliefs and interpretations • Changes in the make-up of the Muslim faith in Kwale • Ongoing inter-faith dialogue • Rise of charismatic and extremist preachers • Poor inter-generational relations and challenged parenting • Demographic influences	• Increase of salafism • Penetration of salafist milieu by recruiters who exploit religion for VE causes • Religious schisms within the Muslim faith • Moderate religious leaders intimidated by extremists • Lower influence by parenting generation on the youth
(4) Technological	• Falling costs of data and widening use of social media and encrypted applications	• Online/Cyber radicalisation with ever greater access to terrorist materials and secret ability to recruit, train and plan attacks
(5) Legal	Security legislation	Unclear coverage of disengagement programmes
(6) Environment	Some vast remote areas and porous border with Tanzania	Hiding places and possibility for escape into TZ

Table 3: PESTLE Analysis

23. Stakeholders Analysis

STAKEHOLDERS	INTERESTS AND HOW THEY ARE AFFECTED BY PROBLEMS	CAPACITY AND MOTIVATION TO BRING CHANGE	POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS STAKEHOLDERS INTERESTS
Elected Political Leaders	To get elected while voting constituency has low regard of institutions they represent	High capacity but low motivation	Start dialogue to addressing voting constituency's concerns
(2) National Administration Officials	To promote development space. plans are compromised because of insecurity.	Medium capacity but high motivation	Increase public trust, continue conversation with the public through innovation
(3) Clergy	To promote and expand missionary work. They at times cross the red line.	High capacity but low motivation	Reduce climate of physical fear and promote moderate messaging
(4) Civil Society	Expand good governance and democratic space. Good intentions marred by inappropriate processes.	Medium capacity and high motivation	Reduce climate of fear Monthly conversations with other stakeholders to understand them

(5) Youth	Employment and self-actualization. They are frontline victims and perpetrators of the problem.	High capacity and low motivation	Create employment opportunities, mentoring programmes, sports activities.
(6) Women	Promote the family and peaceful society, victims of situation. Silent observers --- at times encouraging and discouraging	High capacity with high, medium and low motivation	Make Groups more resourceful and expand their agenda.
(7) Professionals	Research on issues and develop research led solutions.	Medium capacity with high motivation	Regular interactions with other stakeholders.
(8)Security Institutions	Enhance law and order. Problem distorts law and order logic	Medium capacity with medium motivation	Structured conversations with the public to promote trust and accountability
(9) Village Elders	Harmonious society. Problem is disruptive to serene atmosphere.	Medium capacity with high motivation	Reduce climate of fear and engage in dialogue.

Table 4: Stakeholders Analysis

CHAPTER 3: HOW TO TRAVEL EFFICIENTLY TO THE DESIRED END STATE

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is the employment of non-coercive means to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies and thus reduce the number of terrorist group supporters and recruits. CVE efforts aim to have an effect on both the radicalisation and mobilisation towards violence processes at work before individuals engage in operational plotting. CVE typically works long term; involves a diversity of actors and agencies working across local and trans-local environments and relies on engaging individual psychology, group dynamics, and public policy to achieve desired ends i.e. the prevention of radicalisation and mobilisation. In Kwale the complexity of the VE process is somewhat mitigated by the fact that many of the programs that can be useful for CVE already exist for other purposes, such as reducing delinquency, countering gangs, and preventing violence. Understanding VE spectrum for Kwale can help in incorporating CVE goals into such existing programs, rather than having to create new programs from scratch.

Effective countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts involve an integrated set of programs that help prevent extremist and violent behavior and disengage those already involved in them. The motivation and drivers that inspire them towards violent action may be due to real or perceived grievances. Countering violent extremist ideology is an important component of CVE, but CVE, properly understood, goes beyond that to address the full spectrum of factors contributing to violent behavior.

Every CVE effort will be responsive to the need to involve communities and citizens. They are the 'ground zero' that violent extremists and terrorists seek to intimidate and control, and every effort by the government and the NGO sector is aimed at serving them. It is citizen ownership of CVE that will provide Kenya's democracy long-term resilience against the appeal of violent extremism. Credible community forums that reflect the diversity and different points of view on the ground should be important engagement points for all CVE actors.

Kenya is a democracy. Elected officials at the Ward, Constituency, County and National levels speak for the largest political constituencies in the country. It is therefore imperative that elected officials be engaged in CVE through their leadership and be empowered and consulted by the spectrum of local and national CVE actors.[1]

GOOD PRACTICES FOR SUCCESS

The following elements of the Kwale CVE Plan reflect insights from the national level strategy. The specific elements are grounded on research and analysis of the prevailing situation on radicalisation, violence, extremism and CVE efforts ongoing in Kwale County. Stakeholders must seek to integrate the following good practices in the design of their operations/action plans.

1. **CVE approaches aimed at addressing the underlying causes of violence must prioritize meaningful inclusion of key stakeholders, particularly women in their development and implementation.** This is particularly critical in the creation of preventative strategies to combat violent extremism. Without the inclusion of all stakeholders particularly, women, the civil society and the security sector, these

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[1] National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, Section 4

initiatives are likely to overlook many factors that have driven individuals and communities into violent extremism.

2. **The Creation and full implementation of national strategy on CVE, peace and security should, be a key component of county level CVE plan.** This CVE Plan should be implemented through coordinate plans across government agencies and institutions and hold them accountable to integrating CVE into related government processes. This can be implemented through a strong commitment to involve civil society in a comprehensive and strategic way, and dedicated funds for implementation.

3. **County Level CVE Plan must recognize and account for the broad range of roles women play in supporting and countering violent extremism.** Though predominantly portrayed only as victims of terrorism, women perform a wide spectrum of roles in driving and promoting violent extremism as well as preventing and countering it. Throughout the history of VE in Kwale women have served as active spies, recruiters, fundraisers, and in support functions of different nature. However, in many places impacted by ongoing VE activities women continue to also be at the forefront of moderating extremist influences. If preventative initiatives are to be effective, they must account for this diversity in roles.

4. **CVE Plan must include a formal coordination mechanism to overcome bureaucratic bottlenecks. A**ddressing bureaucratic obstacles can be one of the most significant challenges in developing and implementing a county plan that involves numerous actors. Building a transparent and comprehensive coordination mechanism will help align policy and practice. In some cases, government that implemented national action plans on women, peace and security established coordination boards to facilitate stakeholder's engagement in the process, including drafting phase. Internal coordination mechanisms can help recalibrate existing institutional rules and regulations to reflect the objectives of Kwale county CVE plan.

5. **Kwale County CVE Plan must have a central "owner" who can ensure coordination of multiple sector stakeholders.** With so many institutions and agencies involved in CVE efforts, it's important to establish a central owner who can, ideally, use both incentives and sanctions to hold agencies and institutions accountable. A central owner can turn strategic policy proclamations into operational, time-bound, and specific agency plans so that each institution is clear on its roles and responsibilities.

6. **CVE Plan and policies must recognize that civil society Organisations are vital interlocutors between government institutions, particularly law enforcement and communities.** As Organisations serving communities throughout the county, they can identify the security concerns and needs of the populations most impacted by violence. Civil society also plays a key advocacy and accountability role, forcing needed institutional reforms and ensuring that state and security institutions do not take actions that harm populations and strengthen citizen's grievances against the state. Activities of CVE plan must be developed through consultations with civil society Organisations to ensure these efforts effectively address the needs of communities.

7. **Dedicated funding streams to support civil society Organisations in CVE programming should be incorporated into county CVE strategies.** This assistance should include access to technical training on program design and grant reporting. Organisations conducting innovative and organic CVE work often do not have the personnel and resources needed to go through the sometimes-long processes of applying for and reporting on large-scale grants.

8. **CVE plan must allocate adequate funding to advance multi-sectorial CVE initiatives that build bridges between civil society and actors in the security sector.** Civil society Organisations can often be a greater force for change when they are able to work with and understand the challenges facing other actors, including politicians and security institutions. In particular, bringing women together from different sectors to advocate for inclusive security approaches is an effective way to bridge the sector divides.

9. **Kwale CVE plan must include systems for monitoring and evaluating the impact of government efforts and those of grantees.** The cornerstone of monitoring and evaluation efforts is establishing clear indicators for success. Policies should prioritize resources and/ technical support for small Organisations; particularly women and youth focused civil society entities. This will allow them to secure the personnel and/ capacity building training necessary to evaluate programmatic impact.

10. CIVIL SOCIETY, NGOS AND CBOS - Radicalisation is often fed by real and perceived local disaffection and alienation from the state, and mainstream political life. This distance can be closed by effective NGOs and CBOs that have local credibility in seeking to build community resilience against radicalisation. This strategy puts civil society groups at the heart of the CVE response.

Recognising the security sensitivity and risks, and in search of positive synergies, all NGOs and CBOs that are implementing CVE in partnership with the GoK should:

- Register in an online portal for CSOs in CVE at https://citizensupport.go.ke

- Seek the input Chair of the County Security and Intelligence Committee (working with the NCTC) and written acknowledgment that the programme will be an effective addition to on-going CVE efforts, is accountable, transparent, has conducted a risk analysis, and utilises public resources responsibly.

- For programmes being implemented locally, provide information necessary to enable the Chair of the County Security and Intelligence Committee (working with the NCTC) with a view to ensuring synergies are exploited and gaps addressed.

- File a biannual report with the NCTC reflecting activities undertaken, numbers of individuals engaged, challenges encountered, outputs, and perceived outcomes.

- Be committed to the protection and advancement of the letter and spirit of the Kenyan constitution, and particularly its values.

- Be committed to the freedom of association and religious belief and practice, the equality both genders and of all ethnic and racial groupings, and the freedom of all Kenyans regardless of their religion, ethnicity or origin, to live in any part of Kenya.

- Be accountable and legitimate to a well-defined constituency.

- Be aware of the risk to their personnel, civilians and the state at all times. There should be an explicit risk analysis in every program concept and proposal that is regularly updated by an independent security expert when a state security agency is not engaged.

All groups engaged in CVE, particularly in those areas that may lead to direct contact and programming with violent extremists, should be extremely cognisant of the laws pertaining to the financing and facilitation of terrorist groups. It is strongly advised that they seek to inform and collaborate with security actors such as the NCTC and the CSIC.

11. Lessons learned globally and nationally demonstrate that the following principles and approaches are important guides to partnering between states, between states and NGOs and civil society, and between organised (Government and NGO) entities and civilians and communities.

- A 'do no harm' approach. CVE is a sensitive activity that is being conducted in the context of determined terrorist operations to radicalise, recruit and attack Kenyans. As such, all CVE initiatives should ensure that they do not exacerbate radicalisation or aid terrorism in any way. This should be e x p l i c i t l y built into all program concepts, monitoring, evaluation and reporting of local and national programmes.

- CVE is being conducted as terrorist organisations plot to carry out attacks in Kenya. CVE efforts should be aware of the risk to their personnel, civilians and the state at all times. There should be an explicit risk analysis in every programme concept and proposal that is regularly updated by an independent security expert when a state security agency is not engaged.

CHAPTER 4: **STAGES OF RADICALISATION IN SOCIETY AND ATTENDANT INTERVENTIONS**

This section describes the preventive and restorative CVE approaches that will be employed in the Kwale CVE plan. Both approaches operate with three levels as illustrated in the figure below:

Figure 1: Shows the various steps of radicalisation and de-radicalisation within a community. Majority of the population are in the green zone (normal and productive citizens), a few are in the orange zone (radicalised but peaceful), while a very few are eventually graduate into violent actors (who require treatment)

As per the NSCVE, the Kwale CVE Plan operates with two broadly defined stages with each being operationalized through three support efforts :

- Prevention efforts stage (termed general preventive efforts in the NSCVE)
- Curative Efforts Stage that are coordinated and directed by national security organs that may utilise the services of specific, authorised and vetted companies, CSOs and/or civilians.

These stages are operationalized through six interlinked sub-efforts that address both

prevention and curative stages (Fig 1 above)

Prevention efforts

(1) Formative efforts

(2) Anticipatory efforts

(3) Targeted Intervention Efforts

Curative efforts

(1) Disengagements Efforts (coordinated with the national security organs)

(2) Rehabilitation Efforts (Directed by the national security organs which may utilise the services of specific, authorised and vetted companies, CSOs or civilians)

(3) Re-Integration Efforts (coordinated with the national security organs)

Formative effort stage: Here efforts target the whole of Kenyan society to address conditions that support the spread and adoption of violent extremist ideology. General preventive efforts at this stage aim to increase individual and community resilience by greatly involving social networks- including families, neighbors, local religious and community leaders to enable them serve as the best inhibitors of, radicalising individuals. Relevant program activities involve raising community awareness about the treat, and, as necessary, helping to equip community leaders with tools, resources, and aid to coordinate public and private services to reach at risk individuals. Activities targeting this group should include:

- Community outreach forums can help raise awareness of radicalisation or mobilisation-to-violent threats as well as provide sounding boards for community grievances that may contribute to the radicalisation or mobilisation of some individuals. Public messaging campaigns can support broader shared values and non-violent behavior.

- Existing community programs- such as team sports, afterschool activities, and mentoring programs focused on community and individual resilience- can serve to rechanneling grievances and address some individual, group, and community vulnerabilities that can contribute to extremist violence.

- Community-oriented policing and networks of religious, social welfare, health and educational Organisations in local communities can identify early on those individuals at risk of radicalising and engage in preventive interventions to mitigate grievances, promote alternative opportunities, and highlight the cost of pursuing extremism.

- General preventive efforts should address broader social, economic, educational, and political circumstances that provide fodder for perceived grievances and that individuals seek to rectify by resorting to violence. Such programs often seek to prevent mobilisation to violent action by enhancing education, social welfare and civic engagement.

Anticipatory effort stage

Efforts on this stage target environments that enable the early stages of radicalisation. In the specific context of the present threat in Kwale, it is crucial to inform, educate and empower Sheikhs, Alims, Imams, and local communities to be able to resist the threat posed by extremists. Specific preventive efforts will also target prisons and remand facilities.

Targeted intervention effort stage

At this stage, efforts will target individuals who are becoming radicalised or are part of a violent extremist group, and can be motivated to disengage. These are typically those who are not the direct subject of counter-terrorism operations or in the criminal justice process for terrorist-related offences. Efforts at this level offer the individuals a way out before it is too late.

Disengagement effort stage

Disengagement programme is aimed at motivating individuals to deserting, defecting or demobilizing from terrorist groups and activities are thus an applied tool on this level. Disengagement programmes help individuals *rethink their ideas and behaviors*

and renounce their support for violence by creating a seed of doubt about the extremist way of life and activating the target persons' intrinsic motivation for abstaining from violence and seeking another more productive way of life. Disengagement will involve every sector of society and particularly family, friends and community leadership. However, disengagement of acknowledged VEs (not just radicalised youth who have not committed a crime) is under the direction and coordination of the national security organs.

Rehabilitation effort stage:

Rehabilitation programmes that aims to ensure that disengaged individuals are given the counseling, critical reasoning tools, and knowledge to shift their mind-sets and enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens. These iInterventions are developed and directed under the purview of national security organs that will contract, coordinate and vet companies, CSOs and civilians delivering specific packages. They are intended to repair an individual's relationship with society amongst others by teaching him or her new coping and vocational skills, addressing the impact of extremist ideologies, and providing cult-departing counseling for those who are highly radicalised. Rehabilitation programs are best initiated after an individual is no longer engaged in violent activities, has renounced radical ideas about violence, and is open to learning new ways of functioning in society. Educational and vocational training, as well as

provision of therapy and economic benefits, help an individual develop new patterns that do not lead to violence.

Reintegration effort stage

Reintegration efforts support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run. Thus rehabilitation programmes focus on bringing individuals back into the social milieu and helping them function socially and emotionally, primarily to establish a sense of normalcy, predictability and harmony with social norms. Reintegration programs support and maintain the new behavior introduced during the rehabilitation process.

Aftercare and monitoring constitute a sub-theme in reintegration programs that includes activities supporting disengagement and rehabilitation. Aftercare assumes individuals have learned new skills and changed their behavior and is intended as a means of maintaining new behaviors. Monitoring is a separate activity in which the national security organs, family members, and authorised NGOs, CSOs track individuals who leave disengagement programs to determine if they are reengaging in violent extremist activities. The strategic interventions will thus take place at six interlinked effort stages according to the figure on the next page.

CHAPTER 5: STRATEGIC ISSUE S AND PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMIM IN KWALE

(a) CVE Circle Structure (The arrows on the right side must point downwards)

Figure 2: CVE Circle

The Formative Effort Stage (Green Circle I)

Strategic Issue

Given the fact that violent extremism takes a long, non -linear trajectory and involves nearly all the younger age cohorts it is safe to conclude that nearly four fifths of Kwale population is at a risk of falling party to various forms of radicalising influences. Especially the youth are at risk and here the following categories should be targeted: School kids, school dropouts, illiterate youth and orphans. General issues to be addressed could include:

- Misinterpretation of religious teachings, Political, religious and ethnic Intolerance
- Social defiance
- Violence
- Ignorance
- Unaddressed historical injustice
- Online radicalisation

Strategic Objective

The major objective is to create strong resilience and promotion of human dignity in the community to withstand the shocks of extremism and violence so individuals and communities are able to withstand and transcend violent extremist ideologies, radicalisation, eliminate sense of marginalisation and discrimination.

This will be achieved by applying a whole range of programmes and activities by both levels of

government on one hand and private and civil society on the other.

Approach and activities:

This intervention will be preventive, have a general approach and be resource oriented. Activities could include:

- Strengthen Nyumba Kumi clusters
- Training of teachers on managing diversity
- Promote the integration of religious schools with formal learning
- Mainstream National values in social activities
- Capacity building of civil society as well as government institutions on CVE issues
- Awareness creation on CVE through barazas, public forums
- Improved access to education and educational infrastructure
- Mentorship programs
- Creating employment
- Improved school transitions
- Training for skills improvement
- Inculcate positive religious teachings
- Policy and frameworks
- Registration of madrassa and streamlining education by embracing a common curriculum and standards
- Joint security-citizen engagements
- Counter narratives and massaging
- Cultural event that create social cohesion

The Anticipatory Effort Stage (Orange Circle I)

Strategic Issue

There are individuals (mainly young persons) who operate in specific contexts and are at risk of being radicalised. They include school dropouts, unemployed youth, idle youth, youth in school and also some in universities

Strategic Objective

The objective and focus will be identifying the push and pull factors that promote radicalisation. Programmes and activities will be aimed at minimizing risk behavior.

Approach and activities:

The intervention will be preventive and anticipatory and have a specific approach that is problem oriented Activities could include:

- Work with Imams and Madrasa Teachers on Counter narratives
- Establish a reporting channels to encourage members of the community to report at risk individuals
- Strengthen collaboration between local government institutions and local communities
- Improve inter-agency co-ordination
- Improve security agencies soft response to VE
- Entrench tolerance programmes

The Targeted Intervention Effort Stage (Red Circle I)

Strategic Issue

At this stage the focus is on persons in extremists environments that are willing to use violence to realise their ideological aims. Individuals of concern can be:

- Those that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist Organisations;
- Members of violent extremist Organisations who have not committed or facilitated violent

- attacks in Kenya or abroad, or for whom there are no evidence of such crimes;

- Individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist Organisations with the wish to no longer support violence or radicalisation, and those who have left such groups in response to an amnesty offer;

- Individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalisation efforts while serving their sentences.

- Individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration efforts.

Strategic Objective

The objective is to disengage these individuals through intervening effort. This can be done by motivating them to disassociate from violent groups.

Approach and activities:

The intervention is preventive and has a targeted approach and is treatment oriented. The purpose is primarily to identify the individuals or groups. The activities has two tracks i.e. disengagement or prosecution:

Disengagement:
- Amnesty
- Surrender process
- Debriefing process
- Mentoring

Prosecution

`This programme has been deployed overtime. In the Case of Kwale, we recognize that it is essential, yet we believe that part of the factor that creates vulnerability towards VE in Kwale

has been treating suspects with indignity and in a manner that does not follow due process. The following methods shall be used:

- Arrests
- Legal prosecutions
- Prisons
- Training law enforcement officer on protecting human rights during law enforcement

The Disengagement Effort Stage: (Red Circle II)

Strategic issue

Persons operating here are either in terrorist groups, prisons or a criminal justice chain system and are perceived to be extremely dangerous. They are all violent extremists.

Strategic Objective

The aim is to cause individuals to depart, defect or demobilize from terrorist groups or renounce violence as a mean to achieve their goals. This is a behavioral or declaration act that can be carried out at various levels in order to support individuals renounce their support for violence by rethinking their ideas and behaviors.

Approach and activities

The intervention is curative and has a targeted approach and is treatment oriented towards the individual activities include:

Disengagement process that operates to create doubt about the extremist way of life these individuals have been living and activating the target persons' intrinsic motivation for abstaining from violence and seeking another more productive way of life linking the effort to the rehabilitation stage

The Rehabilitation Stage: (Orange Circle II)

Strategic Issue

1. Persons at this stage are dis-engaged and motivated for rehabilitation but they are not certified to join mainstream society

Strategic Objective:

2. To give counseling, critical reasoning skills and knowledge to enable them to be peaceful and law abiding citizens

Approach and activities

3. The intervention is curative and has a rehabilitation approach that aims to ensure that disengaged individual are given counseling, critical reasoning skills, and knowledge to enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens

4. The rehabilitation state is the second phase of the de-radicalisation process. Activities include:.

   ▪ Psychosocial and mental support

   ▪ Reconciliation with broader society

   ▪ Skills and talent empowerment

Reintegration Stage: (Green Circle II)

Strategic issue:

5. The reintegration stage is the final process of de-radicalisation. Here former radicalised persons are completely rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.

Strategic Objective:

6. To re-integrate refers to actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities.

Approach and activities:

The intervention is curative and has a reintegration approach and its success requires social willingness to accept and accommodate the affected, and thus requires concerted efforts to lower stigma and encourage acceptance. Regular after-care and monitoring programmes are carried out to observe and evaluate progress. Activities will include:

   ▪ Documentation,

   ▪ Safety,

   ▪ Investigation

   ▪ Settlement

CHAPTER 6: CRITERIA FOR PRIORITISATION

To maximize this multi-stakeholders approach, the County Policing Security Forum working under the leadership of the County Commissioner shall make use of a framework that focuses on prevention, identification and exit. While the central objective of this plan is to develop and expand efforts at the community level to counter violent extremist recruitment and radicalisation to violence, it operates from the premise that the state has the obligation to ensure right to security for all its citizens. This understanding has been used to make decision on which stakeholder has obligation at what level.

This plan also operates from the understanding that they three levels of prevention, identification and exit are never static nor linear. The experience of the various stakeholders suggests that they are circular. For that reason, the plan responds to each of the items in a dual character. (Refer to CVE circle in figure 2 above)

The third criterion is that of unpacking and follow of the National Counter Terrorism Policy at the county level for it to produce verifiable results on the ground. The plan is therefore aligned to the various pillars in the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (See annex 3). The 9 pillars are:

- Psychosocial
- Education
- Social
- Political
- Security
- Faith Based and Ideological
- Arts and Culture
- Legal and Policy
- Media and Online

MEASURING RESULTS AND EFFECTS

Monitoring and Evaluation

1. Monitoring and evaluation is an important management toll that will play a critical role in measuring the plans activities. It will also ensure that agreed results are within budget and the time frame. The following methodologies will be used:

- Performance indicators
- DatA collection and analysis
- Data collection tools
- Formal surveys
- Rapid Results method

CHAPTER 7: IMPLEMENTATION

Phasing and Sequencing

1. This strategic plan will be implemented over the 2016/17 – 2021/22 plan period. Some activities will be undertaken in parallels while others will be in sequences. This plan is designed to achieve optimum results through proper mix of the two.

Operation/Action Plans for stakeholders

2. The success of this plan shall largely depend on the positive and concerted actions from the diverse stakeholders in Kwale. Stakeholders and all actors will be encouraged to develop respective operation plans that will unbundle and break the operation plan into distinct activities on annual basis. Resource and Activity schedules will be seamlessly integrated in the plan. This plan identifies what each category of stakeholder should aim to do in order to effectively meet the objectives of this plan.

Roles of Different Sectors in the Kwale CVE Plan

3. The successful implementation of this plan shall depend on close cooperation between different stakeholders including the national government, county government, faith based organization (FBOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

4. There shall be established a County CVE Forum comprising of these various stakeholders. The forum shall meet quarterly to review progress of the activities the various actors have undertaken in the quarter. The forum shall be convened by the County Commissioner for Kwale

National Government (Ministries, Departments and Agencies) shall:

- Provide leadership in counter violent extremism interventions
- The National Counter Terrorism Centre will coordinate national efforts in CVE.
- Develop innovative and holistic strategies of countering VE
- Respect human rights in endeavor to counter violent extremism
- Be transparent in undertaking interventions and responses to VE
- Counter VE without discrimination on the basis of tribe, religion or race.
- Adhere to principles of good governance in implementing CVE measures
- Build the capacity of structures and agencies set-up to counter VE
- Conduct research to inform development of legislation, policies and strategies to counter extremism
- Strengthen collaborative efforts between government agencies and with non-state actors
- Enhance co-operations with other countries that face similar security threats from VE and secure Kenya's borders
- Conduct public sensitization on the threat from extremism
- Release and implement reports by government committees/commission

established to investigate grievances by affected communities and individuals

- Facilitate independent investigations on human rights violations by state in countering VE in the past

- Initiate development programs targeting poor and unemployed youth specifically in active recruitment areas of Ukunda, Diani, Bongwe, Mbuani, Shamu, Mwamanga, Vukani, Matuga and Lunga Lunga

- Develop a legislative and policy framework to safeguard the country from the risk and threats of returnees

County Governments shall:

- Support and facilitate efforts of national government, civil society and faith based Organisations in CVE

- Promote peaceful co-existence among different communities

- Participate in developing and implementing legislation and policy framework on CVE

- Build capacity of relevant departments and agencies involved in Countering Violent Extremism

- Foster cooperation with national government on matters of security

- Conduct research to inform on innovative approaches to countering violence and extremism

- Support functioning of County Policing Authority

- Support implementation of Citizen Security Programs

- Initiate and finance youth empowerment programs

- Ensure use of approved early childhood curriculum in institution like madrasa and other religious learning institution

- Make efforts to improve the livelihood support structures for madrasa teachers

Faith Based Organisations shall:

- Initiate, support and co-ordinate counter VE interventions and responses

- Act transparently in designing and implementing CVE programs and shall register at https://citizensupport.go.ke

- Ensure use of religious institutions and forums to educate and promote peaceful co-existence and security

- Promote moderation and support for Kenya's Bill of Rights.

- Engage individually with youth in youth friendly spaces (youth centers, schools, sports fields) and on social media to counter extremism

- Be transparent, democratic, tolerant and accountable in their interventions and responses to counter violent extremism

- Participate in collaborative efforts of countering VE

- Document and share success stories, learning and best practices in the implementation of CVE programs and projects

- Establish a county-wide faith based framework of inter-faith engagements and dialogue on countering violent extremism

- Co-operate with state actors and non-state actors in preventing, mitigating and managing VE

- Firmly reject misinterpretation of religious teachings and actively engage in addressing the misinterpretation

- Monitor activities of member to prevent infiltration of violent extremist groups

Civil Society Organisations shall:

- Act transparently in designing and implementing CVE programs and shall register at https://citizensupport.go.ke

- Engage in responsible advocacy efforts in public interest considering the sensitivity of VE

- Hold government accountable to uphold human rights and rule of law in responses to VE

- Contribute and support coordinated programming and implementation of CVE interventions and responses

- Build the capacity of their staff in countering VE

- Document and share success stories, learning and best practices in implementation of CVE programs and projects

- Establish a county CSO network to co-ordinate CVE programming and reporting

- Adapt a holistic approaches on countering VE (address both pull and push factors) and integrate into all programming

- Develop innovative VE programs targeting the youth

- Support Government agencies to uphold human rights and the rule of law

Media

- Be responsible and sensitive in coverage of VE

- Provide positive coverage of CVE efforts including success stories and achievements by state and non-state actors

- Promote and champion CVE initiatives

- Act as watchdog on state interventions

and responses to countering violent extremist

Communities

- Participate and co-operate with CSO and FBOs to implement the Kwale CVE Plan

- Co-operate with state actors in prevention and mitigation of VE

- Peacefully co-exist with each other regardless of tribe, religion and political persuasions

Individuals Citizens

- Respect the rule of law

- Promote, practice and nurture ideals of patriotism, tolerance and peaceful co-existence

- Be vigilant and provide intelligence to state agencies

- Co-operate with state, faith based and civil society actors in prevention and mitigation of VE

- Peaceful co-exist with each other regardless of tribe, religion, and political persuasions

- Hold the government accountable to counter VE interventions and response

Bilateral and Multilateral Partners

- In regard to multilateral partners, Kenya's CVE initiatives will be responsive to the principles, practices and strategies of the UN Counter Terrorism Architecture, including binding Security Council resolutions and the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. In programme conception, ownership and implementation, Kenya embraces long-standing commitments to 'best practice' approaches in regard to

national ownership, and particularly the delivering as one approach.

- Both bilateral and multilateral partners shall be mindful of national government focal points and early and substantive engagement with them.

- There are particular implementation challenges and opportunities that are especially important to the bilateral and multilateral partners and allies with which Kenya works extensively. It is critical that partners follow the approaches outlined below and the principles committed to in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the context of CVE.

- Ownership: Countries, in relation to bilateral and multilateral partners, are led by national governments that lead the conception and prioritisation of development processes through wider participation in policy formulation, taking a greater lead in aid coordination, and utilising every available opportunity to deliver through government systems. CVE funding/support should have the recognition of the National Government.

- Harmonisation: It is critical that donors ensure that duplication is avoided through better coordination, information sharing, simplified application and implementation, and shared

Figure 3 below summarizes the organizational framework and the roles of various actors:

Figure 3: Organizational Framework

Human Resources

At the moment many people are involved in CVE activities. Some are known while many more are not on their programmes. For the 1st time it will be possible to ascertain the number of Organisations and people involved in the CVE program. Actors within the plan with specialized knowledge will be re-grouped in activities that will match their skills on one hand while creating cross functional teams on the other to eliminate duplication and overlapping.

Knowledge Resources

Currently, knowledge management of violent extremism is weak. Knowledge is an intangible

asset in CVE. A small permanent committee will be tasked with developing knowledge management systems to support CVE activities. This will be based at the County Commissioners office. Since VE is majorly an ideological issue, countering it will rely on knowledge management value chain that clearly maps out its mutating forms, its mental models and its Kwale context. The team will support the CSIC with technical assistance.

APPENDIX

ANNEX 1: LOG FRAMES FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Formative Effort Stage: Green I

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal – A society free from danger and fear	The County's Human Security and peace status improved by October 2021	Vision 2030-Second Medium Term Plan (2013-2017)	Political Stability and Democratic Governance
Purpose – To create resilience in the general society through enhanced community mobilisation and engagement	Improved peace, security and tolerance levels by 60%	Annual Reports – National and County Government Ministerial Reports	Relevant institutions invest in efficient processes
Outputs/Results **(1) Nyumba kumi programme** **(2) Madrassa Curriculum Development??** **(3) Integration of religious and formal schools programme** **(4) Peace programmes** **(5) Empowerment programmes**	(1) Nyumba Kumi Guideline policy document (2) Madrassa curriculum document (3) Policy paper on integration by MOE and County Government (4) Policy documents by Peace Building Secretariat in MOICND (5) Policy documents by relevant National, County Governments and NGOs on empowerment funds	Quarterly and Annual Reports	(1) Law and Order (2) Rule of Law (3) Budgetary provisions

Activities (1) **To strengthen Nyumba Kumi clusters** (2) **To train teachers** (3) **To integrate religious schools with formal learning** (4) **To mainstream peace activities** (5) **To strengthen six empowerment programmes**	(1) Nyumba kumi clusters operational (2) Madrassa teachers trained (3) Religious schools integrated (4) Peace committees operational (5) (a) Individuals to benefit from Youth Fund (b) Individuals to benefit from Women Enterprise Fund (c) Individuals to benefit from UWEZO Fund (d) Individuals to benefit from NYS programme (e) To benefit from Kwale County Fund (f) To benefit from NGO Funds	Monthly Reports	

Table 5: Formative Effort Stage: Green I

2. Anticipatory effort stage: Orange I

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal – A society free from danger and fear	The County's Human Security and peace improved by October 2021	Vision 2030–Second Medium Term Plan (2013–2017)	Political stability and Democratic Governance

Purpose – Prevention of Risk behavior	Reduced Risk behavior by 60%	Annual Reports – National, County and NGO Reports	Relevant institutions invest in efficient processes
Outputs/Results **(1) Dialogue forums** **(2) Tolerance Programmes**	(1) Baraza Guide for Administration officials (2) Document/ Declaration by Political leaders on youth engagement (3) Guide by Supreme Religious Authorities on moderate messaging (4) Critical thinking booklet by Governments/ Religious Authorities (5) Mentoring programme guidelines (6) Gender Programme Guidelines	Quarterly and Annual Reports	(1) Political will (2) Religious will (3) Budgetary provisions
Activities **(1) Improve quality of dialogue forums** **(2) Entrench tolerance programmes**	(1) Two quality barazas per month by every level administrator (2) Two quality youth barazas per month by every elected political leader (3) No. Of religious institutions implementing moderate messaging (4) No. of critical thinking sessions (5) No. of mentoring sessions for various youths (6) Gender Sessions	Monthly Reports	(1) Political will (2) Religious will (3) Budgetary provision

Table 6: Anticipatory effort stage: Orange I

3. Targeted intervention stage: Red I

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal-A society free from danger and fear	The county's Human Security and peace status improved by October 2021	Vision 2030-Second Medium Term Plan (2013-2017)	Political stability and Democratic Governance
Purpose-To dis-engage violent extremist individuals.	90% of radicalised persons who have accepted disengagement in principle	NCTC Annual Report CC (Kwale) Annual Report	Relevant institutions invest in efficient processes

Outputs/Results
 	
  - **Amnesty programme**
  - **Disengagement programme**
  - **Criminal justice programme**
	(1) Amnesty Programme Guidelines
	(2) Legislation
		- NCTC Annual & Quarterly Reports
		- County Commissioner Annual & Quarterly Reports
		- National Police Service reports
		- Kenya Prison Service Reports
			(1) Legislation

Activities
 	
Disengagement: Amnesty period
  (b) Surrender process
  (c) Debriefing process
  (d) Mentoring
 	
Prosecution:
  (a) Arrests
  (b) Prosecutions
  (c) Prisons
	(a) No. Of persons willing to surrender
	(b) No. Of persons surrendered
	(c) Debriefing sessions
	(d) Mentoring sessions
	
	(a) No. Of arrests
	(b) No. Of prosecutions
	(c) No. Of convictions
	(d) No. Of those released under "Power of Mercy" prerogative
		Monthly Reports	

Table 7: Targeted intervention stage: Red I

4. Dis-engagement Effort stage: Red II

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal-A society free from danger and fear	The County's Human Security and Peace status improved by October 2021	Vision 2030 Second Medium Terror Plan (2013-2017	Political stability and Democratic Governance
Purpose- to identify terror Network	-	-	Efficient processed by state organs
Outputs/Results	-	-	
Activities	-		

Table 8: Dis-engagement Effort stage: Red II

5. Rehabilitation Effort stage: Orange II

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal-A society free from danger and fear	The county's Human Security and peace status improved by October 2021	Vision 2030-Second Medium Term Plan (2013-2017)	Political stability and Democratic Governance
Purpose-To rehabilitate Disengaged persons	All Disengaged persons are rehabilited	- NCTC Annual Report - CC Kwale Annual Report - NGO Reports	Relevant institutions invest in efficient processes
Outputs/Results **Rehabilitation programme**	Rehabilitation Programme Guidelines National legislation County legislation	"	Adequate Resources will be availed

Activities	(1) No. of persons given psychosocial and mental support.	Monthly Reports	
(1) Psychosocial and mental support			
(2) Reconciliation efforts	(2) No. and quality of reconciliation initiatives		
(3) Skills and talent empowerment	(3) Percentage of new skills and talents spread among the individuals.		

Table 9: Rehabilitation Effort stage: Orange II

6. Re-integration Effort Stage: Green II

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Important Assumptions
Goal-A society free from danger and fear	The county's Human Security and peace status improved by October 2021	Vision 2030 – Second Medium Term Plan (2013-2017)	Political stability and Democratic Governance
Purpose-To integrate Rehabilitated persons	Document those integrated Resettle of those integrated	NCTC Annual Report	Relevant institution invest in efficient processes
Output/Results - Documentation programme - Safety programme - Settlement	(1) No. of persons settled/or integrated	Monthly Reports	Availability of Resources
Activities - Documentation - Security of persons - Settling Processes	No. of Persons resettled	Monthly Reports	

Table 10: Re-integration Effort Stage: Green II

ANNEX 2: STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. Formative effort stage (green I)

Strategic Issue: Society assailed by Violent Extremism

Strategic Objective: To create resilience in the General Society

Strategic	Activities	Expected Output	Responsibility	Performance Indicator	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
(1) Re-configure Community Policing	1.1 –Operationalise County Community Oversight Authority	County Police Oversight Authority launched	-C.S.I.C. -C.G.	Quarterly meeting of the Authority	16/17	1 Million	–	–	–	–
	1.2 – Re-design Nyumba Kumi Clusters	Recreated Nyumba Kumi clusters that express and reflect will of people	-C.S.I.C. C.G	New design of Nyumba Kumi clusters	16/17	.5 Million	–	–	–	–
	1.3 –Hold fresh Nyumba Kumi elections	Elections held in all clusters	-C.S.I.C.	No. of elections held	16/17	4 Million	–	–	–	–

Strategic Area	Activity	Output	Responsible	Indicator	Timeframe	Budget					
	1.4-Train Nyumba Kumi	All clusters trained	– C.S.I.C.,, – CG, – N.G.Os, – GOK strategic partners	No. of clusters trained	16/17	20 Million	–	–	–	–	–
	1.5-Monitor weekly Nyumba Kumi meetings	Every cluster meets every week and minutes taken	– C.S.I.C. – Sub C.S.I.Cs – Div. S.I.Cs – Sub county administrators – Ward administrators	No. of issues solved in each cluster	16/17 – 20/21	.5 Million	.5 Million	.5 Million	.5 Million	.5 Million	.5 Million
	1.6-Provide monthly advise	Monthly evaluation reports produced to improve Nyumba Kumi output	C.S.I.C.	No. of recom mendations as adopted	16/17 – 20/21	.1 Million	.1 Million	.1 Million	.1 Million	.1 Million	.1 Million
(2) Embrace the proposed Madrassa Curriculum	2.1-SUPKEM and C.I.P.K. to hold consensus forums	Bring together Islamic Scholars	-KMDI -SUPKEM -C.I.P.K -GOK -CG -N.G.Os	Meetings held	16/17	5 Million	–	–	–	–	–

Activity	Verifiable Indicators	Implementing Agency	Output Indicator	Timeframe	Budget					
2.2 – Develop Madrassa Curriculum	Curriculum as working guide for Madrassas	-KMDI -SUPKEM -C.I.P.K. -GOK -CG N.G.Os	Curriculum in place	16/17	5 Million	–	–	–	–	–
2.3 – Roll out the curriculum	No. of Madrassas and those that are using the curriculum	SUPKEM C.I.P.K.	No. of Madrassas using the curriculum	16/17	1 Million	–	–	–	–	–
2.4 – Monitor and Evaluate the curriculum	Monitoring and evaluation reports	-SUPKEM -C.I.P.K. -N.G.Os -G.O.K. -CG	Percentage of monitoring and evaluation reports acted upon	16/17 – 21/22	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million
(3) Strengthen Empower ment Funds										
3.1 – Streamline Youth Fund	No. of youth -benefiting -improving businesses	GOK	Youths engaged in quality businesses	16/17 – 21/22	5 Million	3 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million
3.2 – Streamline Women Fund	No. of women -benefiting -improving businesses	GOK	Women engaged in quality businesses	16/17 – 21/22	5 Million	3 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million

					5 Million	3 Million	2 Million	2 Million	2 Million
3.3–Streamline Uwezo Fund	"	GOK	Persons engaged in quality business	16/17 - 21/22					
3.4–Streamline County Government Funds	"	CG	Persons engaged in quality business	16/17 - 21/22					
3.5–Streamline N.G.O. Funds	"	N.G.Os	Persons engaged in quality business	16/17 - 21/22					

Table 11: Formative effort stage (green I)

2. Anticipatory effort stage (orange I)

Strategic Issue: Environment that is vulnerable to Risk Behavior

Strategic Objective: Prevention of Risk Behavior

Strategies	Activities	Expected Output	Responsibility	Performance Indicator	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
Review Dialogue Forums and Sports	2.1-Realign Public Barazas by National Administration and County Public Administration	Promote barazas as accountability forums	-C.C. -D.C.Cs -A.C.Cs -Chiefs -Assistant chiefs -Subcounty administrators -Ward administrators	No. of issues sorted out in Barazas	16/17	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million
	2.2-Systemise and intensify political conversations	Encourage elected political leaders to hold scheduled meetings with public	All Elected Leaders	No. of meetings held by leaders	16/17-20/21	-	-	-	-	-

			Indicator	Timeframe						
2.3-Intensify peace forums	Retrain and roll out peace committees	-C.C. -Peace committees at all levels -NGOs -GOK Partners	Issues addressed by peace forums	16/17 - 20/21	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M
2.4-Regularise and widen interfaith forums	Create interfaith forums and create consensus on messaging	-SUPKEM -C.I.P.K. -N.C.C.K -GOK -CG -NGOs	No. of meetings held and level of consensus	16/17 - 20/21	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million
2.5-Promote Youth Membership programmes	Have professionals and college students talk to youth in rural areas	-C.C. -C.D.E. -C.Y.O. -C.G. -NGOs -GOK Strategic Partners	No. of mentorship programmes	16/17 - 20/21	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M	30 M

2.6-Promote Gender Programmes	Have Gender specialists talk to various forums	-CC -UN Women -SGO -NGOs -CG	No. of forums held	16/17 - 20/21	10 M	10 M	10 M	10 M	10 M	10 M
2.7-Sports Enhancement	Positively Engaged Youth	-CC -CSO -CG -NGOs -CDF	No. of various Sports	16/17 - 20/21	50 M	50 M	50 M	50 M	50 M	50 M

Table 12: Anticipatory effort stage (orange I)

3. Targeted intervention effort stage (red I)

Strategic issue: Threat of sleeper cells and Active Groups

Strategic Objection: to identify Terror Networks

Strategies	Activities	Expected Output	Responsibility	Performance Indicator	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
Law Enforcement (1)	Identification of Terror Networks	Identify covert and overt terror cells	Security Agencies C.S.I.C.	-	16/17 – 20/21	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget

Table 13: Targeted intervention effort stage (red I)

4. Disengagement effort stage (red II)

Strategic Issue: Persons with extremist views ready to use violence

Strategic Objective: To Disengage Violent Extremists

Strategies	Activities	Expected Output	Responsibility	Performance Indicator	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
1. Amnesty	Surrender process	To allow those willing to surrender to do so.	C.S.I.C. SUPKEM C.I.P.K.	No. of surrenders	16/17	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million	5 Million
Law Enforce ment (2)	4:2:1-Arrests	Arrests made	Police	No. of arrests	16/17-20/21	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget
	4:2:2-Pro secutions	Presentations done	D.P.P.	No. of prosecutions	16/17-20/21	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget
	2:Imprisonment and Probation	Effective imprisonment	-Judiciary -Prisons -Probation	No. of indictments	16/17-20/21	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget	GOK Budget

Table 14: Disengagement effort stage (red II)

5. Rehabilitation effort stage (orange II)

Strategic Issue: How to handle dis-engaged persons effectively

Strategic Objective: To Rehabilitate Disengaged Individuals

Strategies	Activities	Expected Output	Responsibility	Performance Indicator	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
(1) Reconciliation Efforts	1.1-Identify victims or Enemies of the disengaged Individuals	Reach out to victims and enemies	-C.S.I.C. -SUPKEM -C.I.P.K. -N.C.E.C.	No. of people reached out	16/17-20/21	20	20	20	20	20
	1.2-Hold engagement sessions with victims or enemies	Sensitize them on the need to forgive	"	No. of those reached out and willing for dialogue	16/17-20/21	30	30	30	30	30
	1.3-Bring the two groups together for reconciliation	Hold joint sessions to ingrain value of forgiveness and reconciliation	"	No. of successful reconciliation sessions	16/17-20/21	25	25	25	25	25

(2) Psychosocial mental support	2.1-Counselling 2.2-Psycho logical healing	Psychologically balanced individuals	-Ministry of Health(CG, GOK) -NGOs -GOK Strategic Partners	No. of people counseled and healed	16/17-20/21	50	50	50	50	50
(3) Skills and Talent Empowerment	3.1-Trade and artisan skills 3.2-Identi fication of Talents	To equip them with quality skills To identify those with special talents for support	-Ministry of Education (GOK) -Trade Ministry (CG) -NGOs -GOK Strategic Partners	No. of persons with trade skills and talents	16/17-20/21	50	50	50	50	50

Table 15: Rehabilitation effort stage (orange II)

6. Re-integration effort stage (green II)

Strategic Issue: How to return rehabilitated persons back into society

Strategic Objective: **To Re-integrate rehabilitated individuals**

programme	Activities	Expected outcome	Responsibility	Performance Indicators	Time Frame	Expected Budget (Kshs. Millions)				
						16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21
(1) Documentation	(1) Register and profile all (rehabilitated persons)	Reliable database	-C.S.I.C -CG -GOK Strategic Partners	Database in place	16/17-20/21	30	30	30	30	30
(2) Securing of the rehabilitated persons	(2) Identify safe haven	Secure rehabilitated persons	-C.S.I.C -CG -GOK Strategic Partners	Safe Havens in place	16/17-20/21	2	2	2	2	2
(3) Settlement of rehabilitated persons	(3) Identify settlement context	(3) Re-integrated persons	-C.S.I.C -CG -GOK Strategic Partners	Settlement Programmes	16/17-20/21	50	50	50	50	50

Table 16–Re-integration effort stage (green II)

ANNEX 2: HOW THE KWALE CVE PLAN SPEAKS TO THE NATIONAL CVE STRATEGY

No.	National CVE Pillar	Kwale CVE plan Objectives	Implementation Plan Activities
1.	**Education**	Component 1: Training and capacity building Component 3: Education, training and capacity building	-Developing madrassa curriculum
2.	**Social**	Component 1: Social/ arts and culture Component 3: Arts and culture	-Systemize and intensify political conversations -Promote youth and gender programmes -Sports enhancement
3.	**Political**	Component 2: Political ,Security	Amnesty/surrender processes
4.	**Economic**		-Streamlining the various funds: Youth, Uwezo, Women, County Government and NGO Funds. -Skills and talent empowerment
5.	**Media and online**	Component 1: Medial and online	
6.	**Psychological**		-Counselling -Psychological healing -Amnesty/surrender processes
7.	**Faith Based**	Component 1: Faith based and ideology Component 3: Faith based	-SUPKEM and CIPK holding consensus forums -Developing madrassa curriculum -Regularize and widen inter-faith forums

8.	Community Resilience	
		-Intensify peace forums
		-Holding engagement sessions with victims or enemies
		-Engagement with rehabilitated persons.
9.	Law and Policy	Component 2: Legal and policy, security
		-Operationalizing County Community Oversight Authority.
		-Re-designing Nyumba Kumi initiatives.
		-Realigning public barazas by national and county public administration.
		-Identification of terror networks
		-Arrests/prosecutions/Imprisonment and probation

Table 17: Linking the Kwale County CVE Plan with the National CVE strategy

ANNEX 3: **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

ANNEX 4: **END NOTES**

- The key state bodies involved are the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the National Board of Social Services, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the Danish Prison and Probation Service, and local authorities, mainly municipalities and police.

- Department of State and USAID.2016. **Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism**

- The Right to a Better Life, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012

- Constitution of Kenya, 2010

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